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The global financial crisis and the subsequent Euro area debt crisis have led to new political 
challenges for the European Union, especially in the domain of welfare policies. This paper 
analyzes the effects of political institutions and societal preferences on the crisis management 
reactions of political elites in the more vulnerable EU member states. It explores two typical 
mechanisms diverting the democratic procedures from their usual stream, mainly in Southern 
and Central-Eastern European countries: an increasing delegation of power to non-elected 
economic policy experts and the strengthening of populist political leaders. The causal 
explanation reveals that the most important factors of the legitimacy of the political elites’ 
crisis management reactions are the trust of citizens in political institutions, the intensity of 
political polarization and the attitudes of citizens towards welfare entitlements. 
Keywords: Legitimacy, Polarization, Politics of crisis management, Trust in political 
institutions, Welfare policy. 
Introduction 
The global financial crisis and the subsequent European debt crisis have led to new political 
challenges for the European Union member countries. Most of the EU economies have had to 
face an enduring crisis and by mid-2013 many European citizens have been experiencing already 
the fifth consecutive year of economic and social hardship. By the end of 2012, the GDP per 
capita in the overall EU was still below the pre-crisis level. Moreover, preliminary results 
(Eurostat, 2013) suggest that economic recession continues in 2013. Briefly: the European Union 
in general and the more vulnerable Southern-European and Central-Eastern European EU 
member countries (SCEE) in particular are in a state of permanent crisis and the economic 
recovery is still in the uncertain future. 
The long-lasting unfavourable macroeconomic environment has several political 
implications. In his seminal book, Political Man, Lipset (1981 [1959]) already underlined more 
than 50 years ago that economic performance is particularly important for fragile democracies. In 
line with this classical thesis, a recent study of Diamond found ‘an apparent correlation between 
bad governance and democratic vulnerability’ (Diamond 2011:21). But the political impact of 
the recent global financial crisis on democracy in the economically harder-hit countries is 
‘surprisingly little: governments have come and gone, but democracy has remained’ (Diamond 
2011:23). Nevertheless, discussing the potential impacts of a longer and more pervasive 
recession, the author prognosticates that ‘at a minimum, illiberal populist and even extremist 
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political parties could be expected to draw many more voters, even in some of the 
postcommunist countries that have joined the European Union’ (Diamond 2011:28). To put it 
differently: we may fairly assume that enduring economic crises exert strong pressure on fragile 
democracies; though in the context of the European Union, democracies will probably survive, 
an increasing populism could be the consequence of the serious economic hardship. In this 
respect, countries’ democratic stocks (the length of democratic experience, Gerring et al. 2005) 
especially matter – economic crisis is a particularly strong test for the relatively new 
democracies. Within the European Union, this is especially true in the more vulnerable societies 
of Southern and Central-Eastern Europe. 
Welfare policies are among the politically most delicate fields of crisis management; while 
economic policy expert groups are typically urging welfare state retrenchment, political parties 
typically resist to this logic of macroeconomic policy expertise. Most of the political leaders at 
least implicitly perceive the fundamental risks of welfare policy reforms associated with welfare 
state retrenchment (Pierson 2002). This paper analyzes the role of politics in shaping welfare 
policies in SCEE in time of crisis. The next section elaborates the conceptual and theoretical 
framework (Section 2), followed by exploration of the impacts of crisis on democracies in 
general and the political variables on welfare policies in particular from a European cross-
country perspective, comparing the more and the less vulnerable groups of countries (Section 3). 
The last section concludes and discusses the main findings (Section 4). 
Conceptual and Theoretical Framework 
Welfare reform constraints are universal challenges in European societies. The status quo is 
unlikely sustainable as three major factors have been generating increasing macrofinancial 
pressure on national welfare budgets: (1) globalisation and more tangible international 
competitiveness, (2) demographic ageing, and (3) the recent global financial crisis as well as the 
subsequent Euro area debt crisis. However, European Union (EU) member countries have had 
conspicuously different performance in their welfare policy adjustment as well as the socio-
economic and political outcome of the welfare policy changes applied (Krumlin 2011). Some 
countries were able to maintain social cohesion while other countries are facing increases of 
social and political tensions aggravating further the welfare policy environment. Concerning the 
policy outcomes, Nordic countries are undoubtedly among the best performers: in Northern 
Europe the period of recession was rather limited and after a temporary moderate loss, the 
previous level of employment has almost been restored, in sharp contrast to the Mediterranean 
and several new EU member countries. The level of income inequalities and poverty (both in 
absolute and relative terms) are rather low in the Nordic countries; in addition, the relatively low 
level of indebtedness may ensure the sustainability of their welfare policies in the longer run. 
High level of Trust and Legitimacy – The Context of Nordic Welfare Reforms 
In his influential paper about the different European social models, André Sapir indicated that 
among EU citizens ‘Nordics enjoy an envious position, with a social model that delivers both 
efficiency and equity’ (Sapir 2006:380). This might logically imply the adoption of the Nordic 
welfare policies in Southern and Central-Eastern Europe (SCEE). However, learning from 
abroad is a difficult and complicated process; when governments are borrowing the ‘best 
practice’ policies and institutions, the expectation that the transfer will lead to policy success 
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may often bring about a disappointing outcome (Dolowitz-Marsh 2000). In the case of 
transferring the Nordic type welfare policies, dissimilarities in the socio-economic environment 
and the behavioural patterns of major political actors can potentially shape the implementation 
inappropriately, viz. the Nordic welfare policies are embedded in a particular socio-political 
context. Namely, in Northern Europe ‘the institutionalization of compromises between divergent 
particular interests (...) was legitimized by the confidence in the virtuous circle of social equality, 
economic growth and widening democracy.’ (Kettunen 2012:38). In other words, the self-
reinforcing mechanisms between trust in political institutions, legitimacy and procedural fairness 
of public policy decisions (De Cremer – Tyler 2007) are fundamental behind Nordic welfare 
policies and this virtuous circle also supports the Nordic welfare state adaptation capabilities (i.e. 
implementing welfare policy reforms) in times of crises. 
The Political Context of Policy Reforms in More Vulnerable European Societies: Delegation of 
Power and a Shift Towards Populism 
At first glance this perspective is disturbingly pessimistic about the transferability of Nordic 
welfare reforms in Southern and Central-Eastern European societies. As both social and political 
trust is significantly lower in the latter groups of countries (Newton-Zmerli 2011, Boda–Medve-
Bálint 2012) policy reformers have a markedly more difficult task in ensuring legitimacy for the 
intended changes. As it was discussed above, in crisis periods the output legitimacy of 
democracy in more vulnerable economies weakens. At the same time, constraints to implement 
welfare policy reforms are increasing. In this sense of urgency, the dilemma of the governing 
political elites is obvious: how to do ‘something’ with the welfare state and to avoid the 
supposed negative electoral consequences simultaneously? In this decision-making puzzle the 
two typical reactions are: (1) the temporary delegation of politically painful decisions to public 
policy experts or/and (2) a shift towards populism. SebĘk (2010) elaborated convincingly the 
theoretical relation between exogenous shocks and the delegation of power from politicians to 
public policy experts; his main argument is that the delegation of power is indeed a rational 
choice of the political incumbents as it may mitigate the supposed electoral losses. 
The shift towards populism is a more complicated issue. Populism in this context, following 
the conceptualisation of Pappas (2012), is ‘the flipside of political liberalism’; a kind of 
‘democratic illiberalism’ (Pappas 2012:2) by the politicization of resentment, the creation of a 
new cleavage between ‘the people’ and (some) establishment and an intense political 
polarisation. While delegation implies a temporary withdrawal of the political leadership, 
populism, on the contrary, rather enables political leaders (political entrepreneurs). Nonetheless, 
the two mechanisms have at least one common consequence: both deviate democratic procedures 
from their usual stream. Delegation evidently weakens democracies, but as Pappas argues, the 
same is true for populist political leadership as well: ‘once in power, populist political parties 
exacerbate polarization, which in turn leads to high social politicization and bipolar politics; this, 
to be sure, is a serious challenge for established democratic patterns’ (Pappas 2012:16). 
Procedural Legitimacy: The Achilles-Heel of Welfare Reforms in Southern and Central-
Eastern Europe 
It is obvious that the success of Nordic welfare policy reforms does not merely come from the 
policy content, but also from the procedural legitimacy. Though Schmitt and Starke (2011) found 
a strong evidence of convergence of welfare policies within the EU, they understand policy 
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convergence as a conditional process upon a large set of socio-economic and political factors. 
For the success of a policy transfer (including the ‘best practice’ of welfare policy reforms) these 
conditions indeed may be more important than the policy content. Briefly, it is assumed that in 
the context of crisis-generated welfare policy reforms (besides governance and historical path 
dependency) politics matter more than policy analytical capacities. The discussion of Einhorn 
and Logue (2010) about the transferability of Nordic-like welfare policy reforms strongly 
supports this assumption. The two authors underline several features of the Nordic political 
environment as crucial in the development of public policy: ‘democratic corporatism, a strong 
civil society, especially among those otherwise weakest in capitalist society (workers, family 
farmers), underpinned by a set of values around empiricism and social trust, in particular, values 
in which solidarity and reciprocal responsibility’ (Einhorn and Logue 2010: 26). 
These ‘conditional factors’ are unlikely prevalent in the more vulnerable SCEE countries. 
We may fairly assume that for most of the welfare reforms in these countries rather the opposite 
is true; to put it differently, procedural legitimacy is typically the ‘Achilles heel’ of welfare 
reforms in these societies. In this respect, Wallner’s typology about the core elements of 
legitimacy in public policy is particularly useful for our research purposes. She makes a 
distinction between the substantive and procedural elements of legitimacy (Wallner 2008:424); 
policy content aligned with the stakeholders and the general public belongs to the substantive 
components while the procedural legitimacy is constituted by three major factors: incubation, 
emotive appeals and stakeholder engagement. Here we may identify a fundamentally critical 
point of welfare policy reforms in more vulnerable societies shaped by ‘best practice’ policy 
transfers. Welfare reforms built upon policy transfers are, by definition, not formulated by 
internal political debates but rather by external (most frequently financial) constraints. In this 
typical sense of urgency ‘there is no time’. First, time is missing for policy incubation that might 
ensure the internalisation of the ideas of reform in the minds of public officials as well as 
domestic politicians and influential policy experts. Second, time is missing for the engagement 
of stakeholders and the public in meaningful participation. It is atypical that a government, when 
initiating a reform agenda from a policy transfer, is willing to slow down the reform process by 
substantially engaging a large set of societal actors. The elitist isolation attitude is more 
compatible with the perception of ‘urgent reform constraint’; reformist governments tend to 
speed up the policy process by ‘fast and efficient’ decision-making that neglects those societal 
actors that do not precisely adhere to the governmental agenda. There is no doubt that this 
decision-making pattern is valid not only for welfare policy reforms in SCEE countries, but is 
generalizable for any kind of policy reform implemented in any country amidst constraints and 
urgency from a policy transfer. 
Welfare policy reforms in SCEE countries, however, have a particular status in this context. 
Because of the globally shared perception of the increasing macrofinancial constraints related to 
the unstoppable ageing of societies, both international financial institutions and domestic policy 
experts repeatedly push governments of more vulnerable societies to adopt ‘best practices’ from 
abroad. It is true that in the proper domain of welfare policy reforms there is a partial shift from 
the focus on cost-containment towards the Nordic type activation policies. But from a procedural 
policy perspective the essential feature of SCEE welfare reforms has remained unchanged: the 
policy transfer from abroad in the sense of strong financial constraints and urgency. It is possible 
that an adopted ‘best practice’ of welfare reform leads to a convincing policy outcome on the 
short run that triggers a virtuous circle between policy effectiveness, the legitimacy of the 
adopted reforms and the trust of stakeholders as well as the wider public in the particular policy 
actors and political institutions in general. Nonetheless, a weak procedural legitimacy poses a 
Explaining Success and Failure in Welfare Policy Changes in Europe... 291
particular risk even in this case; various types of exogenous factors may induce a shift towards 
an opposite, vicious circle – first and foremost the problems of governance effectiveness. 
The self-reinforcing mechanisms between trust, legitimacy and the policy outcome as well 
as the difficulties of welfare policy reforms in SCEE countries are theoretically clear. Moreover, 
a recent study of Trüdinger and Bollow (2011) about the evaluation of welfare state reforms in 
Germany gives convincing empirical evidence that trust in political institutions and historical 
legitimacy of welfare policies may play a primary role in the perception of new reform 
initiatives. Indeed, the particular way in which political factors are shaping the context is, 
ultimately, an empirical question. The next section discusses this issue. 
The Role of Politics in Welfare Policies: A European Cross-Country Comparison 
More and Less Vulnerable Societies in Europe 
The first step of the empirical research is defining the vulnerable societies in Europe. One 
possible option could be to apply a pre-defined institutional criterion: for instance, belonging to 
the group of the twelve new EU member countries or the former cohesion countries (Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain) would be a reasonable criterion. Another (generally preferred) 
option is to define the level of vulnerability according to a set of empirical indicators. A 
plausible tool for this is the use of the macroeconomic imbalances procedure (MIP) scoreboard 
set-up by the European Commission in December 2011. The MIP aims to identify whether 
serious macroeconomic imbalances exist or risks of it are emerging in the EU member countries. 
It defines alert thresholds for 11 indicators of external imbalances, competitiveness and internal 
imbalances (for more details see: European Commission 2013). The level of imbalances is 
undoubtedly a good proxy of the national economic vulnerabilities (Bobeva 2013). For the 
purpose of this research the pre-crisis period is relevant to assess the vulnerability of countries, 
therefore the indicators of the MIP scoreboard for 2007-2008 (the average of the two years) are 
used, with one adjustment; unlike the MIP scoreboard, I do not consider high current account 
surplus as an indicator of vulnerability. The following table shows the classification of the EU 
members by their level of vulnerability (numbers between parentheses indicate the number of 
violated thresholds in the average of 2007-2008). 
Table 1. Vulnerability of the EU-27 countries. 
Less vulnerable EU countries before the global
financial crisis  
More vulnerable EU countries before the global 
financial crisis 
Austria (1.5), Finland (1.5), Germany (1.5), Netherlands 
(1.5), France (2), Italy (2), Czech Republic (3), 
Luxembourg (3), Sweden (3), Denmark (3.5), Slovenia 
(3.5), Belgium (4), United Kingdom (4) 
Greece (4.5), Hungary (4.5), Cyprus (5), Lithuania (5), 
Poland (5), Estonia (5.5), Latvia (5.5), Portugal (5.5), 
Romania (5.5), Slovakia (5.5), Ireland (6), Bulgaria (6.5), 
Malta (6.5), Spain (6.5) 
Source: European Commission MIP Scoreboard 2007 and 2008. 
One may obviously argue about the arbitrary placement of threshold violation between 4 and 
4.5. However, not only the number of violations but also the degree of violation matters, and that 
is an additional reason for the choice of our cutting point. The extremely high general 
government debt of Greece (110% of the GDP) and the extremely bad net international 
investment position of Hungary (-105.6% of the GDP) obviously put these two countries in the 
vulnerable group, while neither Belgium nor the United Kingdom had such an extreme violation 
of any of the thresholds of imbalances. Eventually, this classification has only two differences 
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compared with the pre-defined institutional approach: Czech Republic and Slovenia are odd-
ones-out; otherwise the new EU members and the old cohesion countries do equally belong to 
the group of more vulnerable countries. 
Vulnerability, Governance and Democratic Deviation 
The first hypothesis to be tested supposes a relationship between macroeconomic vulnerability 
and democracy in time of crises. More precisely, we can expect that since the onset of the global 
financial crisis there has been a tangible deterioration in the quality of democracy in the more 
vulnerable European societies, and in this group of countries the regression of democracy is 
significantly higher than among the less vulnerable EU member states. To test this hypothesis the 
Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy (EIU DI) is used. The choice of this index is 
partly technical: unlike other commonly used democracy indices (e.g. provided by the Freedom 
House or the Polity IV Project) the EIU DI covers all of the EU member countries. In addition, 
there is another strong argument for the preference of the EIU DI: this democracy index 
encompasses not only the formal but also the more substantive components of democracy such 
as political participation and civil liberties (for a more detailed discussion, see Kekic, 2007). For 
the democracy value of the pre-crisis period the average of the years of 2007 and 2008 is used, 
and is compared with the most recent data available (about 2012). As a control variable a proxy 
of crisis management is applied, namely the perceived quality of government effectiveness from 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project of the World Bank Development Research 
Group (Kaufmann et al. 2010). Again, the 2007-2008 average values for the pre-crisis period are 
considered and they are compared with the most recent available data (in this case about 2011). 
Table 2. Quality of democracy and government effectiveness in the EU-27: mean values (standard deviations in parentheses). 
 Before the crisis 
(2007-2008) 
Recently 
 (2011-2012) 
Change since  
the onset of the crisis 
Quality of democracy 8.20 (0.80) 7.98 (0.82) -0.22 
Government effectiveness 1.14 (0.64) 1.16 (0.62) +0.02 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit Index of Democracy and World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
Table 2 indicates that since the onset of the global financial crisis the quality of democracy 
has deteriorated in the European Union in general. In addition, the volatility (measured by the 
standard deviation) of the quality of democracy has also increased, meanwhile the perceived 
government effectiveness has remained stable. Nevertheless, to test our hypothesis the essential 
point is whether democracy has been regressing significantly more in the more vulnerable 
European countries. 
Table 3. Quality of democracy and government effectiveness in less and more vulnerable EU member states, changes between 
2007-2012 mean values (standard deviations in parentheses). 
 Less vulnerable countries More vulnerable countries 
Quality of democracy, 2007-2008 8.70 (0.70) 7.74 (0.58) 
Quality of democracy, 2012 8.55 (0.65) 7.45 (0.59) 
Change, 2007-2012 -0.15 -0.29 
Government effectiveness, 2007-2008 1.54 (0.51) 0.77 (0.52) 
Government effectiveness, 2011 1.55 (0.50) 0.80 (0.49) 
Change, 2007-2011 +0.01 +0.03 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit Index of Democracy and World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
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The results presented in Table 3 supports this hypothesis. Though since the beginning of the 
crisis democracy regressed in both segments of the EU countries, the difference in the quality of 
democracy has markedly increased between the less and more vulnerable EU members. On the 
other hand, the difference in perceived government effectiveness has slightly decreased between 
the two set of countries. In the crisis period the variance between the group of less and more 
vulnerable countries remained significant in both dimensions, but the F-test value increased from 
15.0 to 21.3 in the quality of democracy dimension, while it remained roughly unchanged (15.4 
vs. 15.1) concerning the government effectiveness. Thus, in general we do not have to reject our 
hypothesis about the significant relationship between vulnerability and democratic deviation in 
Europe during this period of crisis. In the next sub-section we discuss some mechanisms that 
may explain this democratic deviation in the domain of welfare policies. 
Welfare Policy Outcome, Trust and Legitimacy 
Evaluating welfare reforms in a cross-country comparison is a challenging task 
methodologically. For quantitative research purposes we obviously have to use a proxy, and we 
know several schools to conceptualize and measure welfare efforts (Jensen, 2011). Green-
Pedersen argues that there is no ultimate solution to the ‘dependent variable problem’ in welfare 
researches; the conceptualisation and the operationalisation are ‘dependent on one’s theoretical 
perspective and research question’ (Green-Pedersen 2004:12). In this sub-section the central 
issue is the outcome of welfare policies; and the conceptual focus on policy outcomes may 
theoretically be justified as ultimately they (and not the reforms or policies per se) constitute the 
major interest of policy actors. 
The main questions of the quantitative cross-country comparison of welfare policies are the 
following ones: (1) How are the national political contexts shaping welfare policy outcomes? (2) 
What kind of political factors may contribute to virtuous cycles versus vicious circles of trust, 
legitimacy and policy effectiveness in the domain of welfare policies? The initial hypothesis is 
that ‘politics matter’: besides economic performance, political variables (trust in political 
institutions, change in the quality of democracy, general ideological support of welfare state and 
the polarization of it) are of utmost importance in welfare policy outcomes. 
Data and Methods 
The cross-country statistical analysis concentrates on the relationship between welfare policy 
outcome and the attitudes at the national level. Attitudes include on the one hand general trust in 
political institutions and on the other, particular attitudes towards welfare policy issues. The 
module “Welfare Attitudes in a Changing Europe” of the European Social Survey Round 4 
conducted in 2008 (hereafter ESS 2008) was designed to tap the attitudes of the European public 
towards the welfare state and its policies; this is an essential, virtually unavoidable source for our 
research. The usual problems of international surveys (e.g. sampling methods, translation or pilot 
testing) are strictly controlled in the data collection procedure of ESS that is ‘widely regarded as 
the most reliable cross-national survey of its kind’ (Zmerli-Newton 2008:78). However, the 
available data sources limit our analysis in this sub-section to only 23 EU member countries 
(Austria, Malta, Italy, and Luxembourg are missing from this survey). Another limitation of 
using this dataset is that we are able to explore the attitudes only in one particular moment and to 
map only simultaneous relations. In addition, the timing of the field work is particularly 
sensitive; as it concentrated on the last quarter of 2008 but also passed through the first months 
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of 2009 it explores attitudes partly before the crisis but partly during the personally tangible 
period of the crisis. Nevertheless, the simultaneous relations between the perceived welfare 
policy outcome and the attitudes are generalizable; although the analysis is a macro level cross-
country comparison of aggregated data by countries, the micro level data collection of ESS 2008 
also permits us to include certain internal socio-political dimensions (e.g. the polarisation of the 
attitudes).  
The small number of the cases (n=23) limits the scope of the applicable methods. As our 
focus is on welfare policies in general (and not the specific welfare domains such as pension, 
labour and family policies), if it is methodologically permitted, we will use common factors 
(principal components) to explore attitudes towards welfare issues. Besides descriptive statistics 
(principal component analysis, analysis of variance and correlation), we test the causal 
relationship between the perception of the welfare policy outcome, the trust in political 
institutions and the legitimacy of welfare provisions also with simple regression equations. 
Variables, Operationalization, Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable used in this sub-section represents welfare policy outcome. The ESS 
2008 maps the perception of welfare policy outcome along four items: standard of living of 
pensioners, standard of living of unemployed, provision of affordable child care services for 
working parents and opportunities for young people to find first full-time job. The internal 
consistency among these four welfare items is high as the value of Cronbach’s alpha coefficient 
is 0.88; hence the use of a common factor of welfare policy outcome is technically justified. The 
constructed principal component of the perception of welfare policy outcome explains 72.9% of 
the total variance of the four original items. 
Nevertheless, we have to examine also the theoretical and empirical validity of this variable. 
Following Sapir’s analysis (Sapir, 2006), the two major dimensions of national welfare 
performances are efficiency and equity; the first can be measured by the level of employment 
while the second by the spread of poverty and social exclusion. The four survey items apparently 
encompass these dimensions; this confirms the theoretical validity of the perception of welfare 
policy outcome as a dependent variable. 
 
  
Charts 1-2. Perception of welfare policy outcome, level of employment and  the ratio of people living at risk of 
poverty and social exclusion in 2008 
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Concerning its empirical validity, the perception of welfare policy outcome correlates 
significantly and positively with the level of employment while significantly and negatively with 
the level of poverty and social exclusion. Measuring employment by the ratio of employed in the 
age group of 20-64 and using the indicator of the ratio of people living at risk of poverty and 
social exclusion (both provided by Eurostat for 2008), the Pearson’s correlation coefficients of 
the perceived welfare policy outcome are 0.59 and -0.78 respectively. It is noteworthy, however, 
that the constructed principal component of the perceived welfare policy outcome does not cover 
the dimension of macro-financial sustainability. If we use gross government debt as a proxy of 
macro-financial sustainability, in 2008 there was no significant correlation between gross 
government debt as a percentage of GDP and the perceived welfare policy outcome: the value of 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient in this relation was only 0.13. In sum, we can confirm the 
constructed principal component as a reasonable proxy of welfare policy outcome in 2008, 
though it does not tackle the macro-financial sustainability aspect at all. 
Independent Variables 
Institutional trust is one of the major potential explanatory variables of welfare policy 
perceptions (Trüdinger-Bollow, 2011). The ESS 2008 provides five items to operationalize 
institutional trust: trust in a country's parliament, trust in the legal system, trust in the police, trust 
in politicians and trust in political parties. An important methodological question is whether the 
creation of a comprehensive variable about ‘trust in political institutions’ is theoretically and 
empirically valid. Fisher et al. (2010) debates that political trust can be treated as a single 
concept, but recent empirical researches (Marien 2011, Boda–Medve-Bálint 2012) support the 
one-dimensional attitude approach. In our case, the internal consistency among these five items 
is very high as the value of Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is 0.98; hence the use of a common 
institutional trust factor is also technically justified. The constructed principal component of trust 
in political and legal institutions explains 92% of the total variance of the five original items. 
Though we cannot directly measure the procedural legitimacy of welfare reforms, as a proxy 
variable we can use citizens’ perceptions about the procedural fairness in the conduct of 
government officials; this variable also covers the legitimacy aspect of welfare service provisions 
(Linde 2012). True, this way we explore the legitimacy of public administration procedures 
shaped rather by bureaucratic actors (public officials) and much less by politicians; the latter 
aspect, however, is reflected by the trust in political and legal institutions. This approach has 
indeed a significant advantage: we may empirically test whether trust in political institutions and 
the perceived fairness of public administration procedures in welfare domains are strongly 
correlated (see also the discussion of Esaiasson 2010). The ESS 2008 provides two items to 
operationalize perception of procedural fairness: whether doctors, nurses on the one hand, and 
tax authorities on the other give special advantages or deal with everyone equally according to 
the impression of citizens. The internal consistency among these two items is high as the value of 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is 0.90; hence the use of a common factor of perceived procedural 
fairness is also technically justified. The constructed principal component explains 91.2% of the 
total variance of the two original items. 
The welfare module of ESS 2008 also provides us a possibility to test the effects of some 
specific political variables related to welfare policies. Welfare policies as public policies in 
general not only create but also require legitimacy (Rothstein 2003) and ideology towards 
welfare state is a key component in providing legitimacy to this policies. More precisely, welfare 
ideologies manifested in different expectations towards states vs. markets in welfare domains are 
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shaping welfare attitudes in general (Sabbagh – Vanhuysse 2010). The ESS 2008 provides six 
items to test this attitude: whether governments have a responsibility to ensure a job for 
everyone, health care for the sick, standard of living for the old, standard of living for the 
unemployed, child care services for working parents and paid leave from work to care for sick 
family members. The internal consistency among these six items is high as the value of 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is 0.92; hence the use of a common factor of expected role from 
government in welfare domains is also technically justified. The constructed principal 
component explains 77.7% of the total variance of the six original items. 
In addition, we have strong empirical evidence that not only average ideological positions 
but also the polarization of these attitudes strongly matter (Lindqvist – Ostling, 2010). To 
measure polarization in expected role from government in welfare domains across countries, we 
use the most common measure of dispersion, the standard deviation. The standard deviations 
calculated from the six questions about the expected role of government are strongly correlated 
at the country level (the lowest correlation is 0.59 and the highest is 0.93). Consequently, the use 
of the average standard deviation of the six items to measure polarization in expected role from 
government in welfare domains gives a valid indicator. 
ESS 2008 also explores citizens’ attitudes towards the supposed effects of welfare 
provisions. The survey provides nine items for this issue: respondents have to express the level 
of their agreement whether social benefits/services (hereafter: SBS) place too great strain on 
economy (1); SBS prevent widespread poverty (2); SBS lead to a more equal society (3); SBS 
encourage people from other countries to come to live in the respondents’ country (4); SBS cost 
businesses too much in taxes/charges (5); SBS make it easier to combine work and family (6); 
SBS make people lazy (7); SBS make people less willing care for one another (8); SBS make 
people less willing look after themselves/family (9). The internal consistency among these nine 
items is not convincingly high as the value of Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is only 0.82. 
However, if we consider the supposed negative and positive effects (perceived societal costs vs. 
benefits) of welfare provisions as two separate set of indicators, we have an unambiguous 
internal consistency. The value of Cronbach’s alpha for the welfare provisions’ supposed 
negative effects (the 1
st
, the 5
th
, the 7
th
, the 8
th
 and the 9
th
 items) is 0.92 and for the welfare 
provisions’ supposed positive effects (the 2
nd
, the 3
rd
 and the 6
th
 items) is 0.96. (The 4
th
 item that 
explores the attitudes of citizens towards supposed welfare-related migration obviously covers a 
separate issue.) Accordingly, we constructed two principal components; the factor of the 
perceived costs of welfare provisions explains 76.9% of the total variance of the five original 
items, while the factor of the perceived benefits of welfare provisions explains 92.8% of the total 
variance of the three original items. In addition, as in the original survey a lower value 
represented a stronger agreement and a higher one a stronger disagreement we multiplied the 
country factor scores of the generated principal components by negative one. 
Finally, we considered the polarization of these two attitudes as well. The standard 
deviations calculated from the five questions about the perceived societal costs of welfare 
provisions are strongly correlated at the country level (the lowest correlation is 0.66 and the 
highest is 0.93), and the same is true for the perceived benefits of welfare provisions (here the 
correlation among the original items varies between 0.85 and 0.91). Consequently, the use of the 
average standard deviations of the original items to measure polarization in perceived costs of 
welfare provisions and polarization in perceived benefits of welfare provisions respectively give 
valid indicators. 
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Results 
At first sight, our results reveal remarkably consistent patterns (see Table 4 below). The principal 
component scores of the perceived welfare policy outcome are significantly higher in the less 
vulnerable countries than in the more vulnerable ones, and the same is true for the trust in 
political institutions as well as the perceived procedural fairness in public administration. 
Table 4. Trust in political institutions, perceived procedural fairness and welfare attitudes in less and more vulnerable EU 
member states  
 Less vulnerable 
countries 
More vulnerable 
countries 
Principal component scores   
Perception of welfare policy outcome 0.76 -0.59 
Trust in political and legal institutions 0.70 -0.54 
Perceived procedural fairness in public administration 0.69 -0.53 
Expected role from government in welfare domains -0.70 0.54 
Perceived costs of welfare provisions 0.32 -0.25 
Perceived benefits of welfare provisions 0.57 -0.44 
Measures of dispersion within countries:
 means (standard deviations in parentheses) 
  
Polarization in expected role from government in welfare domains 1.93 (0.22) 1.98 (0.25) 
Polarization in perceived costs of welfare provisions 1.02 (0.08) 1.05 (0.06) 
Polarization in perceived benefits of welfare provisions 0.88 (0.10) 0.99 (0.08) 
Note: bold fonts indicate significant differences (p<.01) between less and more vulnerable groups of countries 
Source: European Social Survey Round 4 (ESS 2008) 
 
In addition, the two groups of countries follow a similar, though somewhat less pronounced 
division in the attitudes concerning the perceived benefits of welfare provisions. The attitudes 
regarding the perceived costs of welfare provisions, however, do not show a marked difference 
by the dimension of vulnerability. Moreover, though the division between less and more 
vulnerable EU member countries in the expected role from government in welfare domains is 
significant, the sign of the relation is opposite to the other variables: citizens of more vulnerable 
societies typically expect significantly larger state intervention. 
The indicators of polarization in welfare attitudes follow the dominant pattern: more 
vulnerable countries are typically more polarized as well, though we can detect a statistically 
significant difference only concerning the polarization in perceived benefits of welfare 
provisions. The results in general underline that among the EU member states there is a strong 
association between vulnerability and the explanatory variables of the perceived welfare policy 
outcome. Nevertheless, certain variables have a variance along other patterns: the expected role 
from governments in welfare domains, the perceived costs of welfare provisions and the 
indicators of polarization in welfare attitudes by countries explore additional dimensions that are 
not unambiguously represented by vulnerability. 
At the level of countries, there is a particularly strong positive correlation between trust in 
political institutions and perceived procedural fairness in public administration. In addition, the 
perceived benefits of welfare provisions are also highly and positively correlated with both trust 
and perceived procedural fairness (see Table 5). In accordance with theoretical implications of 
previous researches (MacIntyre 2001, Weymouth 2011, Körösényi 2012) the polarization of 
attitudes correlates negatively with either trust in political institutions, or perceived procedural 
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fairness or the supposed benefits of welfare provisions. This negative relationship is particularly 
strong concerning the polarization in the perceived benefits. 
Table 5. Bivariate correlations between trust in political institutions, perceived procedural fairness and welfare attitudes in EU 
member states  
 TRUST_P
OL 
PROC_
FAIR 
GOV_
WELF 
COST_
WELF 
BENEFIT_W
ELF 
POLAR_
GOV 
POLAR_
COST 
POLAR_ 
BENEFIT 
TRUST_ 
POL 
1 .85** -.50* .03 .80** -.40 -.40 -.77** 
PROC_ 
FAIR 
 1 
-.48* .07 .69** -.46* -.45* -.72** 
GOV_ 
WELF 
  1 
-.65** -.43* -.34 .06 .46* 
COST_ 
WELF 
   1 
-.07 .39 .19 -.10 
BENEFIT_
WELF 
    1 
-.41* -.33 -.72** 
POLAR_ 
GOV 
     1 
.41 .40 
POLAR_ 
COST 
      1 .59** 
POLAR_ 
BENEFIT 
       1 
Notes: TRUST_POL: Trust in political and legal institutions; PROC_FAIR: Perceived procedural fairness in public 
administration; GOV_WELF: Expected role from government in welfare domains; COST_WELF: Perceived costs of welfare 
provisions; BENFIT_WELF Perceived benefits of welfare provisions; POLAR_GOV: Polarization in expected role from 
government in welfare domains; POLAR_COST: Polarization in perceived costs of welfare provisions; 
POLAR_BENEFIT: Polarization in perceived benefits of welfare provisions. 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.  ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
Source: European Social Survey Round 4 (ESS 2008) 
 
To test the causality between welfare policy outcome and the potential explanatory 
variables, we run various specifications of the regression y = ȕi Xi +İ, (1) where y is the 
perceived welfare policy outcome and Xi is a vector of explanatory variables measured at the 
country level. 
Table 6. Effects of welfare attitudes on perceived welfare policy outcome in EU member states. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Perceived procedural fairness in public administration .43 (.20)* .59 (.15)** 
Expected role from government in welfare domains -.41 (.27)  
Perceived costs of welfare provisions -.20 (.17)  
Perceived benefits of welfare provisions -.14 (.20)  
Polarization in expected role from government in welfare domains -1.08 (.83)  
Polarization in perceived costs of welfare provisions 3.19 (2.01)  
Polarization in perceived benefits of welfare provisions -4.23 (1.96)* -3.46 (1.45)* 
Adjusted R2 .75 .75 
Notes: The dependent variable is the perception of welfare policy outcome. A constant was estimated but is not reported. 
Reported values are unstandardized B coefficients (standard errors are in parentheses). 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
Source: European Social Survey Round 4 (ESS 2008) 
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Because of the obvious multicollinearity among the independent variables, we try to 
minimize the number of variables entered simultaneously in regression. As trust in political 
institutions and perceived procedural fairness are particularly highly correlated, we do not keep 
both of these variables simultaneously. The first specification is an otherwise all-encompassing 
endogenous model (Model 1) that keeps each of the potential explanatory variables (except the 
trust in political institutions). The second specification (Model 2) derives from the first one, but 
keeps only the two statistically significant variables after using a backward elimination 
procedure. 
 
Chart 3. Perception of procedural fairness and polarization in perceived welfare benefits. 
According to our expectations, the two models explore a significant positive effect of the 
perceived procedural fairness and a significant negative effect of the polarization in perceived 
welfare benefits on the perceived welfare policy outcome. In descriptive empirical terms (see 
Chart 3 above), the division of more and less vulnerable EU member states was clearly reflected 
in the welfare policy domain, already before the onset of the crisis. Nevertheless, our results 
indicate some partial exceptions: Estonia, Ireland and Cyprus rather belonged to the ‘better’ 
group of countries where the perceived procedural fairness was relatively high and the perceived 
polarization in provided welfare benefits was rather low or moderate. Indeed, as this 
constellation could be considered as a proxy of legitimacy of welfare policies, it indirectly also 
implies the crisis management ability of the political elites in welfare domains. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we tried to explore some mechanisms of crisis management potential in the 
European Union member states since the onset of the global financial crisis. We presented that 
the Southern and Central-Eastern European countries were significantly more vulnerable than the 
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leading Northern EU members already before the crisis. The vulnerability of the SCEE countries 
is not simply related to their ‘economic vulnerability’ (e.g. real estate bubble, current account 
deficit or level of indebtedness), but also to the weaker input legitimacy of their democracies. 
Not surprisingly, in the crisis period the quality of democracy regressed more in the more 
vulnerable EU member states: this implies that in these countries the usual democratic 
procedures more probably deviated either by delegation of power to non-elected policy experts 
or through a shift towards populist political practices. 
We considered welfare policy areas as a particularly tangible domain of these trends. The 
enduring macrofinancial crisis has enhanced the constraints of implementing politically always 
risky welfare reforms, and the general trust in political institutions as well as the perceived 
procedural fairness in public administration became key factors of legitimizing the crisis-induced 
changes. In this respect, more vulnerable EU countries typically suffer not only from lower 
political trust and weaker procedural fairness in public administration, but also from two 
additional problems: the higher expected role from government in welfare domains and 
especially the stronger polarization in perceived benefits of welfare provisions. Moreover, 
procedural fairness and polarization in welfare issues are causal factors of perceived welfare 
policy outcomes. Indeed, the chance of welfare reforms in the more vulnerable countries is 
generally weak. Even if the ruling political elite may fairly consider itself being in a loss domain 
(Vis – Van Kersbergen 2007:160), most of the citizens in vulnerable societies will unlikely 
cooperate with reformist policy experts. They will more typically consider the retrenchment 
intentions as illegitimate ones; therefore unless tangible socio-economic results trigger a virtuous 
cycle between the outcome of welfare reform policies, trust in political institutions and 
legitimacy of democratic procedures, we can expect a general revival of populist political 
leadership in the vulnerable societies of Southern and Central-Eastern Europe. 
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